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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
L~XION

PACIFIC RAILROAD

COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
- vs. -

Case
No. 10361

EL PASO NATURAL GAS

COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

The parties will be ref erred to as in the trial court.

KATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, having paid damages to an employee of
<lefendant who was injured due to plaintiff's negligence
at a railroad crossing, seeks indemnification from defendant under the terms of plaintiff's standard form of
deed by which various pipeline easements had earlier
h(·rn granted to defendant.
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DISPOSITION IN 'I1HE LOWI~R CO-CRT
After
the case became at issue ' and the, fact':s wer~
•
ascertarned through discovery procedures, each part•,
formally moved the trial court for summarv
J'udgtnf'nt,
• J
in its favor and, after argument and subsequent l'on,
sideration of memoranda from both sides, the trial e-0urt
entered summary judgment for the defendant and entered its order denying plaintiff's motion.
Plaintiff has appealed from the swnmary judgrne1t
and attempts, also, as shown by its Notice of Apped
and its brief, to appeal from the order denying its motion
for summary judgment. An appeal does not lie from such
an order. Haslam v. Paulsen (1964) 15 'Ctah 2d 185, 38~
P. 2d 736.

1

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Since each party requested the trial court to enter
summary judgment in its favor, it follows that each
party represented to the court that there remained no
"genuine issue as to any material fact" (Rule 56, ['.ah '
Rules of Civil Procedure). Plaintiff's representation
was distinctly made in its motion ( R. 78) and was oral!::
reaffirmed to the trial judge, who specifically askNl
counsel for plaintiff, before his oral argument began on
March 4 1965 whether the issue to be submitted to the ,
'
'
· the deed
court was the interpretation of the paragraph m . .
ffirmativeh.
relating to indemnity. Counsel answered a
·

3
Despite this, plaintiff now asks this Court, in the
,.,·ent plaintiff otherwise fails in this appeal, for a rerersal to permit a trial upon the merits. There is nothing
about this case that suggests or requires a departtire
from the rule announced by this Court in 1964, in rejecting a similar request in a case whire both parties had
moved the trial court for summary judgment. Mastic
Tde Dii:ision vs. Acme Distributing Compariy, 15 Utah
~d Uii, 389 P. 2d 56.
Plaintiff further erroneously asks the Court to view
tlw facts in the way most favorable to plaintiff, apparPntly assuming that, because thi~ appeal is taken from
a ~muunary judgment, the ordinary rule in such cases
must apply.
As will be demonstrated in the argument in this
hriet', the judgment of the trial court was completely
correct and should be affirmed even if all factual infert>nces are indulged in favor of plaintiff's position.
However, this is not a proper case for application
of the usual rule of "favorable indulgence" that applies
to the court's review of a summary judgment. Since
Loth parties submitted this controversy to the trial court
for the purpose of obtaining its interpretation of a written instrument, with the material facts not in dispute,
this case, in truth, is more nearly analagou:s to the situation which arises when parties present to the court a
<·ase upon an agreed statement of fact.
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1·
. Here, the. trial court had before it all the· fact spam
tiff wanted it to consider, including statements m
· 14
·
Responses to defendant's Request for Admission that are
not just factual, but are supported by plaintiff's ver~ion
of the inferences to be drawn therefrom. And, with all
this factual and inferential weight upon the scales th·
'
trial court concluded plaintiff was not entitled to reliet'.
Since the case was submitted to the trial court~
if the facts were agreed, this •Court should indulge even
reasonable intendrnent in favor of the judgment and
proceed to the basic problem of learning what faets werE
before the trial court when it rendered its decision.
To that end, defendant now sets forth a concise
recitation of those faets, including many inferences urged
by plaintiff both here and in the trial court. It is upon
these facts and the law applicable to them that the trial
court, five weeks after oral judgment, and two weeb
after the last memorandum was submitted, ordered sum·
mary judgment for defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 13, 1956, plaintiff Union Pacific Railro~
Company for a total consideration of $826.97, preparetl.
'
f d ed to
executed and delivered its standard form o e
·r· N thwe~t
defendant's predecessor in interest, Paci ic ·or '
.
t al easement to
Pipeline Corporation, grantmg a perpe u

5
rin• s(•paratP parcels of land, each 50 feet wide and

hmHlrPd fept long, for "construction, operation,
1llaint1·1w1H·1•, n·pair, renewal, reconstruction and us2"
,Ji a µ:as pipP lint>, ''togetlwr with the right of ingress
anti .. µ:n·s~ to, from and upon" the strips of land and
~uhj1 1 C't to tlu conditions, terms and limitations found
:n tlH· d<'Pd, Exhibit "A" attached to plaintiff's com;ilaint ( R. G).
:-<'\(•ral

1

Tlw dt>Pd provided that th(' defendant agreed to
1rnl1·Hmi1\ and save harmless the plaintiff

.. from and against any and all liability, loss, damag-e, elaims, demands, actions, causes of action,
('Osts, and expenses of whatsoever nature, including court eosts and attorneys' fees, growing out
of injury or harm to or death of persons whomsoPwr, or loss or destruction of or damage to
propPrty whatsoever, including the pipe line [of
tlw defendant] when such injury, harm, death,
lo:-:-, <l<>strtwtion or damage, howsoever caused,
g-rows out of or arises from the bursting of or
IPaks in the pipe line, or in any other way whatso;•vPr is duP to or arises because of the existence
of tlw pipe line or the construction, operation,
111aintenancP, repair, renewal, reconstruction or
u.s<' of the pipe line or any part thereof, or to
tlH• contPnts therPof or therefrom."
Tlw pipP linP was installed shortly after delivery
of tlw deed. Tlw railroad crossing, where the accident
Ot'('UrrPd out of whieh this controversy arose, was north
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and east of the pipe line. Between the crossin
. 1.
g aJH11 t];.,
pipe me were other lands of the l)laintiff not d ·
.
'
~~
m the. deed. and also
lands
owned
by others n t
.
.
' o part11·,
to this smt, wluch extended to the north and to th'
east of these parcels of land ( R. 43, -14).
On November 30, 1963, defendant's employee Stacpi
drove a truck across plaintiff's railroad tracks at a cru~:.
ing and sustained injuries when struck by plaintilf')
train. The tracks were located upon a railroad right of
way owned by Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. and lPased
by it to plaintiff. Prior to 1930, Oregon Short Line con·
structed the crossing over its tracks and plaintiff ha~
maintained the crossing for many years (R. 42, 44).
At the time of the accident, Stacey was not on any
of the ground described by the deed, and at that time
he was not engaged in making any repairs or performing
any maintenance or work on the pipe line of defendant,
but was enroute to the pipe line right of way for tl1t
purpose of reaching a particular point on the pipe line
where he was to show those who were following him
in another truck what work was to be perfonned by the
latter on the pipe line at that point (R. 151, 152).
The route Stacey had intended to follow, and would
have followed but for the accident, was generally to the
south up to and across the railroad tracks of plaintiff,
'
.
ri ht
then south across the south portion of the railroad g

7
ot' way, tlH·n across plaintiff's land contiguous to and

iut11wdiately south of the right of way vwhich lands were
not uwntionPd or described in the deed), then over a
\,rnlgP aeross a ereek, and then across lands of others,
Jwadiuµ: g-enerally to the west to a point ~ to % mile
~outh and % mih~ or more west of the crossing where
tli(' aee.idPnt oeeurred (R. 46, 47).
During the course of the intended route of travel
i'Jtae('Y would have entered upon and crossed over plain~1ff's lands not described in the deed, would have crossed
uwr thP lands of others, then would have entered upon
and erosst>d over plaintiff's land which surrounded the
;>U-fuot parcels, and would then have come upon one or
mon, of said parcels where the pipe line was located
(IL -ts).
ln short, neither the tracks nor the crossing nor the
:-::nrrounding railroad right of way nor the property just
to thP south thereof was immediately contiguous to any
property dt•scribed in the deed (R. 43, 47, 48).
Stae(•y fih•d suit against plaintiff February 4, 1964,
~PPking damages for his personal injuries caused by
plaintiff's negligence in the crossing accident of NovemlH·r :m, 1%~), and on ~lay 7, 1964, plaintiff gave notice
and t(·ndert>d to defendant the defense of Stacey's suit.
ThP tender was declined and the suit was settled by
j;lainti ff's payuwnt to Stacey of $340,000. Plaintiff then
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brought this action, demanding indemnity from def d
en ant upon the basis of the language in plaintiff's det'<l
as previously quoted herein.
'
In the months prior to the execution of the deed in
March, 1956, and for the following period of more than
six years and eight months until the date of Stacev's
accident on November 30, 1963, plaintiff never had ~m
conscious, fixed, subjective intent to grant to defenda~t
or its predecessor in interest any right to the use of
the roadway and crossing over the tracks it leased from
Oregon Short Line Railroad, and, instead, the right of
ingress and egress mentioned in the deed was intended
to refer to ingress and egress over the areas of land
owned by plaintiff immediately surrounding the parcels
of land described in the deed (R. 51).
During the negotiations between plaintiff and Pacific
Northwest prior to the deed covering the easements,
plaintiff's representatives pointed out that plaintiff was
not then exposed to any risk from a pipe line, simply
because no pipe line existed and that while plaintiff was
willing to grant easements upon its land to permit pipe
line construction, it expected to be "in just that good a
position after the pipe line was constructed" (R. 50).
Plaintiff's representatives also stated at that time
that plaintiff would draft the instruments of conveyance
"in a form acceptable to plaintiff" and "designed to in-
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sun• to the maximum possible extent that plaintiff was
and would be as fully protected as possible against any
risk or exposure to risk" which would be "created or
arise by virtue of the construction of or the existence
and operation of said pipe line" (R. 50).
The "facts" set forth in the two previous paragraphs
arP found in plaintiff's expository and argumentative
t't'sponse to defendant's Request for Admission No. 9
(R. .+9, 50, 51). Presumably, the response represents the
most favorable information plaintiff could offer on the
controlling issue in this case - the intent of the parties
3$ rPvf'ah'd by their negotiations and by the deed.
It is therefore highly significant that, despite such

rPritation of the detailed recollection of its representatives who participated in the negotiations, plaintiff was
forced to concede it could find no "written record of,
nor "·itness with personal recollection of, arvy discussion
or negotiation on the subject of indemnity" (R. 50)
\emphasis ours).
From this it follows there was never any discussion
hetween the representatives of the parties on the more
spPcific and controlling question of whether there would
be responsibility and liability, in indemnity or otherwise,
upon Pacific Northwest, and thus upon this defendant,
for thf' negligence of plaintiff.
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Although plaintiff now contends that, despite th\'
foregoing facts, the deed it drew was intended to providP
indemnity against loss resulting in whole, or in part,
from plaintiff's own conduct, the deed itself does not 80
state. either in clear and specific terms, or at all (R. 10).
The foregoing facts and inferences were all before
thA trial court for its consideration. Since plaintiff characterizes the procedure in this case as "somewhat unusual" and since its brief (pp. 7-8) implies this most
important case was pre-judged by the trial court, with a
closed-mind attitude, the record should be set straight.
Such implications constitute an unwarranted disserviceto
Judge Ellett who told plaintiff's counsel, after expressing
his preliminary view at the first hearing February 19,
1965:
"Well, maybe I had better let you argue it to
somebody then because this is a matter of considerable importance and shouldn't be jumped at.
I have a feeling now on it, and I don't see how you
can possibly do it, but some other judge mi~ht
see it and certainly he ought to have the tlllle
to co~sider it and to read your cases and listen
to your argument in full." (R. 160, 161).
Thereafter, and without objection from plaintiff's
.
· mo f ions for
counsel, it was agreed both sides
would file
summary judgment and that full argument would be
heard by Judge Ellett March 4, 1965. On that date, be-
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ginning at 8 :00 a.m., in open court, counsel argued for
~lightly more than two hours.
Further, plaintiff submitted its memorandum of
more than 23 pages. Defendant then submitted a memorandum almost as long. Plaintiff filed a reply memorandum. All three memoranda are in this record. The
trial cou:rt's notes, made upon the margin of plaintiff's
principal memorandum, reflect not only consideration
of its contents, but examination of cited authorities as
well. The court entered its order directing summary
judgment 15 days after it received the second of plaintiff's two memoranda of authorities (R. 136).

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECT'LY DETERMINEn THAT PLAINTIFF WAS N<Yl'
ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATiON FROM
DEFENDANT UNDER THE TERMS OF
THE DEED, AND 'THE SUMMARY JUDG~'LE.N"T

SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

Earlier this year, this Court succintly stated the
principles of law that should control the determination
of the fUjlldamental question in this case - the intention
of the parties. In Ba.rrus v. Wilkinson (1965), 16 Utah
2d 204, 398 P. 2d 207, which involved the legal interpreta-

1I
I
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tion of a paragraph relating to indemnity in a lease, the
Court said:
. "In inte_rpreting a prov1s10n m a contract,
this court will try to determine the intention f
the parties, and a defendant, normally, is bou~d
only to the extent the terms expressly indicate
o_r at l~a~t fairly a~d rea_sonably imply an obliga'.
hon ( citm~ cases _mvolvmg ordii;iary contracts).
vVhere an indemnity agreement is involved it is
generally held that the agreement wul not be construed to cover losses to the indemnitee caused
by his own negligent acts unless such itntention
is expressed clearly and unequivocally. Especially
is this true where an affirmative act of negligence
is involved." (Emphasis ours.)

Plaintiff, in its brief, (p. 42) concedes this to be the
rule.
Two other fundamental propositions of law should
also be noted at the outset. The first is that the Court
cannot rewrite a contract for the parties nor enforce
upon them one of the Court's own making. Genola Town
v. Santaquin City (19-±1), 100 Utah 62, 110 P. 2d 372,
East Millcreek Water Co. v. Salt Lake City (1945), lOS
Utah 315, 159 P. 2d 863.
The second basic proposition is that doubtful portions of a contract should be construed against the party
who draws it. Huber & Rowland Construction v. City of
South Salt Lake (1958), 7 Utah 2d 273, 323 P. 2d 258.

13
'L'his was F nion Pacific's contract, its standard form of
deed which it insisted it would prepare to its liking. If
it wanted to be protected against its own negligence, why
did it not say so, in clear, unmistakable language?
If it wanted someone else to assume an "open-end"

liability without foreseeable limit, why did it not say
so in the deed it insisted upon preparing! Why did it
not prepare that deed in language that anyone could
understand, so that Pacific Northwest and its successors
would have been given definite notice, in clear and unmistakable terms, that they would be required to assume
and pay for losses, whether catastrophic or not, caused
by someone over whom they could have no control!
The plain fact is, Union Pacific never intended to
be so protected. The admitted facts clearly establish
that neither of the parties mentioned in the deed ever
had any intent to agree upon the claimed indemnity,
but plaintiff now asserts the Court should, nevertheless,
detPrmine that they did agree upon it.
The parties never contemplated or discussed the
use of the crossing, which had been in existence for years,
hut plaintiff now asserts the Court should, nevertheless,
determine that they did contemplate it and did discuss
the ramifications of its use, including loss resulting from
plaintiff's negligent operation of its trains upon it.

l
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The parties never contemplated nor discus:sed either
the negligence of the railroad or the liability of defendant
for such negligence, but plaintiff now asserts tlw Court
should, nevertheless, determine that they did so.
Such assertions, heedless of the true intent of the
parties, unmindful of their discussions and negotiatiom,
and regardless of the nature of the circumstances of
the transaction, are but subtle artifices of counsel who,
armed with 20/20 hindsight, now seek to extricate their
client from the effects of a $340,000 case of negligence.
Aside from the complete absence of discussion or
negotiation between the parties on the subject of indemnity for loss due to plaintiff's own conduct, the language
utilized by plaintiff in its deed is illuminating. Except
for loss which might have arisen because of bursting of,
or leaks in, the pipe line, neither of which is involved
here, the indemnity paragraph in the deed provides
for indemnification only for loss which "is due to or
arises because of the existence of the pipe line or the
construction, operation, maintenance, repair, renewal,
reconstruction or use of the pipeline . . . " (Ernphasi~
added.)
The loss in question was due to, and arose because,
Union Pacific was negligent at its crossing. Union Pacific had no loss "because of the existence of the pipe
line'' or because of its "maintenance" or " renewal"
·

i
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Plaintiff in its brief resorts to selections from the
dictionary dl:'finition of the word "cause." To read the
definition fully is instructive. Webster's International
Dietionary, :2d Edition, defines the word "cause" as:
"That which occasions or effects a result;
the nPcessary antecedent of an effect; that which
dekrmines the condition or existence of a thing,
P~pecially that which determines its change from
one form to another.'' (Emphasis added.)
There can be no doubt that the "necessary antecedent" of the accident and thus the loss in this case
and that which "effected" the result, was the negligence
of the plaintiff. The pipe line could have been in existL'nce a thousand years, and it could have been renewed
and maintained daily or even hourly and there would
have been no accident and no loss to the plaintiff until
the neces,1.;ar.11 antecedent fact - plaintiff's negligence occurred.
To say, as urged by plaintiff, that the existence,
maintenance or operation of the pipe line caused Stacey's
injuries is to substitute sophistry for common sense.
l'.ndn thi:;; reasoning, it could as easily be argued, had
Stacey lwen :;;truck by a Union Pacific train and injured
at a erossing in Kemmerer, 'Vyoming, while enroute to
the pipe line an hour before the accident, that his injury
was due to or arose because of the existence, maintenance
or operation of the pipe line. If such a statement were
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v~id,, then by the same reasoning, it would make no
d1fference if his injury had occurred even more remotely
as he crossed the Wyoming state line, en route to the
pipe line.

The basic reason for rejection of such an argument
has been well stated by Professor Prosser as follows:
"In a philosophical sense, the consequences of
an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of
an event go back to the discovery of America
and beyond. 'The fatal trespass done by Eve
was the cause of all our woe.' But any attempt
to impose responsibility upon such a basis would
result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts,
and would 'set society on edge and fill the courts
with endless litigation.' As a practical matter,
legal responsibility must be limited to those causes
which are so closely connected with the result
and of such significance that the law is justified
in imposing liability. Some boundary must be set
to liability for the consequences of any act, upon
the basis of some social idea of justice or policy."
Prosser on Torts ( 2d Ed.), 218, 219, Sec. 44,
Causation in Fact.
Plaintiff confuses the stage with the actors, the
circumstances surrounding an injury with the cause of
the injury.
'The principal point of plaintiff's brief, as found in
its Point I and the following 28-page argument, only
serves to confound the confused position it has asserted.
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lt begins with the confident pronouncement (p. 13) that
defendant relies upon the concept of "proximate cause"
- that there would be no indemnity for loss not "proximately caused" by the existence, use, operation and
maintenance of the pipe line.

Having set up this "straw man," plaintiff then
launches an attack to destroy it. The fact is, defendant
has never based its principal defense upon the test of
the tort law doctrine of proximate cause. Defendant's
memorandum to the trial court does not even contain
the phrase ( R. 82-103). ·The "straw man," as a principal
defense, exists only in plaintiff's argument.
The test here is the traditional test of contract law:·
what was the intent and contemplation of the parties,
measured by their prior discussions and negotiations,
as merged into the agr~ement in controversy.
1

::\Ieasured by that test, and by the conceded rule
that an agreement to indemnify one for his own negligence must be stated "clearly and unequivocally" (Barrus
r. Wilkinson, supra), the argument here must be held
not to provide indemnity. There is ample precedent
in accord.
In reaching the decision in Barrus v. Wilkinson, this

Court cited, as supporting authority, the holding of the
Supreme Court of California in Vimnell vs. Pacific Elec-
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tric Railway Co. (1959), 340 P. 2d 604. Significantlv ti,
• ' I~
V innell case is strikingly similar in its facts to the ca~l'
at bar. It involved an action for damages caused wlwn
a locomotive and freight cars on the railway company
were switched into an open excavation maintained IJy
Vinnell Co. on railway property, while constructing~
stonn drain. This construction had required the railway
company to take up portions of its tracks while Yinnell
Co. excavated a ditch, and the railway employees negligently aligned a switch in such a way as to direct a train
along a track which had been terminated at the excavation.
Before Vinnell entered upon railroad property to
begin its work, the railroad granted it an easement to
use railroad lands for the storm drain. The easement
was prepared by the railroad and contained a paragraph
relating to indemnity, which read, to the Pxtent pertinent
here, as follows :
"8. Contractor (Vinnell) agrees to indemnify
and save Railroad harmless from and against any
and all ... loss, damage and liability, howso.eve.r
same rnay be caused, resulting directly or mdirectly from the performance of any or all work
to be done upon the property and .beneat!t th~
tracks of railroad and upon the premises adJacen
thereto ... " (Emphasis ours.)
·The railway contended, as does Union Pacific he~e,
that this broad language evidenced an intent to be m·

19

demnifif'd for its own negligence. 'The Supreme Court
ot' California, in rejecting that contention, said:
The courts have consistently adopted the
position that indemnification clauses are to be
strictly construed against the indemnitee in cases
involving affirmative acts of negligence on his
part ...
"

1

"Both by precedent and good reason, if an
indemnitor ... is to be made responsible for the
negilgent acts of an indemnitee over whose conduct it has no control, the langauge imposing such
liability should do so expressly and unequivocally
so that the contracting party is advised in definite
terms of the liability to which it is exposed. The
indemnification clause in the present case, by not
expressly stating that the defendant was protected
against acts of its own negligence, failed to meet
this requirement." (Emphasis supplied.)
The italicized language of the agreement is the same
as the language on which Union Pacific relies in the case
at bar.
The emphasized language of the decision directly
applies to the facts here because this defendant had no
control over Union Pacific's conduct, there was no express and unequivocal language and defendant could not
have been advised "in definite terms" of the liability
now sought to be fastened upon it.

r
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There is ample and respected opm10n elsewlwr"
which supports defendant here. The annotated opinio~
of the Fifth Circuit ·Court of Appeals is replete with
case citations and text authorities on this subject in
Batso~Cook Co. v. Industrial Steel Erectors (1958), 257
F. 2d 410, where the claimed indemnity arose from the
Standard Form of Subcontract in which the subcontractor
" ... assumes entire responsibility for losses,
expenses, demands and claims in connection with
or arising out of any injury ... to any person ...
alleged to have been sustained in connection with
or to have arisen out of or resulting from the
performance of the work by the subcontractor ...
and agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Contractor ... from any and all such losses ... "
In an observation which in pointedly pertinent here,
the Court noted the facts were not in dispute and neitlwr
was the law and stated:
"Indemnitee and indemnitor, in briefs which
reflect the consummate skill of articulate craftsmen in exhaustive research that leaves naught
for independent probing by us, are at one on what
the law is, not only generally, but in Alabama
and in the Fifth Circuit as well ... They are thus
in complete agreement that the problem i~exor
ably begins and ends as one of construc~ion ~f
the specific contractual tenns, and that m this
process it is the law which steps in and t~lls th~
parties that while it need not be done m an)
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particular language or form, unless the imtention
is unequivocally expressed in the plainest of
words, the law will consider that the parties did
not undertake to indemnify one against the consequences of his own negligence." (Emphasis
ours.)
The arguments advanced by Union Pacific in its
brief are reminiscent of the contentions of unsuccessful
counsel in the Baston-Cook case. They were dispatched
by the Court with these comments, also particularly
aµpropriate here:
"But we do not think that these arguments
are persuasive, nor do we believe that the matter
can or ought to be resolved by matching this or
that case against language which, by the very nature of things, varies as scriveners set out to draft
these instruments or businessmen uncritically put
their signatures on printed traditional forms. The
problem, as we said before, begins and ends as
one of construction in the light of general princ1ples that are now so well rooted that the business
world must reckon with them.
"The phrase stressed heavily is indeed broad.
But the broad, all-inclusiveness of langauge used
is itself one of the indicia which the law regards
as insufficient. The purpose to impose this extraordinary liability on the Indemnitor must be
spelled out in unmistakable terms. It cannot come
from reading into the general words used the
fullest meaning which lexicography would permit.
In the atmosphere which the general principles
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~·eflect, the phrase i8 ~·(_•ally ~ut a means of defin~ng th.e sc.op: of th: mdemmty, that i::;, the area
~n whi~h it i.~ apphca~le, not th.e legal reach of
i.t on~e it ~PiilH'8. In .tlns respect it ::;erves a usdul
function m broadenmg the physical and actual
situations \vhich might be covered. (Emphasi~
ours.)

"·while the language is well adapted to defining the areas of the application, it is not peculiarly
apt to define causes either in tenns of physic~
or legal responsibility. An injurious incident could
arise out of or result from, or be sustained, in
connection with the performance of the work
whether the real or legal cause was that of the
Indemnitor, the Indemnitee, or both, or equally
likeiy, unrelated third parties. And to these questions as to what partie8 brought about the incident, there would have to be added inquiry
whether any of those actually resposible for it
were so in law. If it could cover any one or all
of the three actual possibilties and any one or aE
of the legal possibilities, it has hardly spelled out
that it will cover the specific and limited, but Berious, situation of negligence by the Indemnitee.
Of course that is just the very reason for the general principle now universally accepted. For thi~
general approach is bottomed on the concept that
this must be specifically, not generally prescribed.
It is an area in which to cover all does not include
one of the parts. Despite this emphasized phrase,
it is apparent that the clause is lacking in that
positive directness which the law regards as essential.",
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Particularly appropriate also to the present case is
the language of the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit in Turner Construction Co. v. W. J.
Halloran &ted Erection Co. (1957), 240 F. 2d 441. It is
appropriate because plaintiff here contends that the
Court should find an intent to indemnify plaintiff, regardless of the amount of the loss, even though the
suhjPct of indemnity was never discussed, and even
tltough the liability which might be thereby thrust upon
<iPf'pndant for plaintiff's negligence would be practically
limitless. The First Circuit disposed of a similar contention in a case where Turner, a general contractor,
claimed indemnity against a subcontractor for a loss the
Turner Company had sustained because of its own negligence. The contract had the following indemnity provis10n:
"The subcontractor hereby assumes entire
responsibility and liability in and for any and
all damage or injury of any kind or nature whatever to all persons, whether employees or otherwise, and to all property growing out of or resulting from the execution of the work provided in
this Contract or occuring in connection therewith,
and agrees to indemnify and save harmless, Turner, its agents, servants and employees from and
against any and all loss, expense including attorney's fees, damages or injury growing out of or
resulting from or occurring in connection with
the execution of the work herein provided."

~

24
The Court went on to say:
"Construed literally, the indemnitv prov1·,·
. ht b .
.
.
~lOil
~1g_ . e mte,rpreh~,d m. such a way as to imposP
hab1hty ?~ 8teel Erection. But to so interpM
the prov1s10n would be to construe it strictly
against the indemnitor, for which there is n~
authority in Rhode Island or anywhere else ~o
far as we know . . . In Rhode Island, as generally
elsewhere, indemnity contracts of the kind unde.r
consideration are construed strictly against the
indemnitee, with the result that an understandin~
fo indemnify against the indemnitee's own negligence will not be inf erred from doubtful language,
but must be clearly and unequivocally expressed.
Obviously there is no such clear and unequivocal
language in the contract under consideration.''
It must now be apparent to the Court, from the
cases cited in the opinions of the California Supreme
Court and the United States ·Courts of Appeal, that ther"
are literally hundreds of cases which have decided questions of indemnity such as that presented here . .:\len•
quotation of continuing numbers of these decisions can
serve no useful purpose. We shall therefore now confine ourselves to those opinions which furnish the reason,
the sound basis, for our contention in this case.

8uch a decision was rendered by the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1953, in Ocean Accident & Guaraufft'
Corp. v. Jan.sen, 203 F. 2d GS2, where a lease provided
that
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·•... Lessee will protect the Lessor and save
Lessor harmless against any claims or demands
for damage ... arising from any cause connected
with th<=' use of the premises, or arising from any
accident, injury or damage whatsoever, however
caused to any person ... " (Emphasis ours.)
The Court should note the underlined words in the
alww quotation. They are very close to the words in the
<ll·Pd in this case - words on which Union Pacific, in
pffrrt, n•sts its Pntire case.

In Jans en, an injury resulted from lessor's neglig"l;nt construction of stairs in the leased premises. The
L\rnrt of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conclusion
that, <ll':-;pite the sweeping language quoted, the lessee
should not be required to indemnify the lessor for its own
nt>gligence. In reasoning to its conclusion, the Court
quoted the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision
in North American Ry. Construction Co. v. Cincinnati
Traction Co., 172 F. 214. The language quoted goes right
tothe heart of the present case and to the basic reason
for denying indemnity:
''Contracts of indemnity such as the one here
sued upon, are usually intended to provide against
loss or liability of one party, through the operations of the other, or caused by physical conditions
that are under the control of the other - over
uo71 ich the party indemnified has no control, and
the party indemnifying has control. Indeed, it
\rnuld tah elear language to show that a contract
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of indemnity
was intended to cover condi't·ions o~
.
operations under the control of the part 11 ind, ·
·' t.m111 .
f. ie· d , an d not und~r t~e control of the indemnih.
mg !?arty, such, for n_ista.nces, as accidents, tl;~
proxm_iate ca':s~ o~, wluch is the negligence of the
party mdemmfied. (Emphasis ours.)
In the present case, the train which smashed Stacey
was under the exclusive control of lTnion Pacific.
Union Pacific, in truth and in fact, had intended to
require defendant to indemnify it for negligence in thP
operation of its own trains - over which it had exclusiw
control - it could have said so, it should have said 80,
but when it drew its deed, it did not say so and, mor~
to the point, it did not say so in "clear and unequivocal''
language.

ir

Although it concedes the "clear and unequivocal"
rule, the railroad finds it necessary to set up the ''straw
man" of proximate cause, only to strike it down with the
scornful epithet "red herring." By devious reasoning,
the railroad finds "clear and unequivocal" expression
in broad general language and, equally devious, finds
a mutual intent and contemplation of the parties despite
the fact they never entertained an idea or exchanged a
thought or word, printed or verbal, on the critical subject of indemnity against plaintiff's own conduct.
·The railroad chooses to ignore the fact that its
broad language deals only with the manner of producing
an effect. Its deed is silent on the subject of the person,,
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or actors against whose conduct it is to be indemnified.
It says only "howsoever caused," not by "whomsoever
caused." It thus speaks only of the action and not the

actor.
As is apparent during any analysis of the language
sPlPcted by the railroad, it may be many things, but it is
not dear and unequivocal. Its generality, rather than a
virtue, is its very vice.
Plainly and simply, the language in plaintiff's deed
fails the "clear and unequivocal" test, and since the place
where Stacey was hurt and the tra1n that hurt him were
under the control of the plaintiff, nothing less than a
"dear and unequivocal" intent to indemnify is absolutely
necessary to plaintiff's case. Such an intent was not
in l~nion Pacific, not in Pacific Northwest, and is not
in this case.
A close examination of the cases principally relied
upon by plaintiff in its brief reveals situations clearly
distinguishable from the present facts. Heaviest reliance
appears to be placed upon Alabama Great So. R.R. vs.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. (5th Cir. 1955), 224 F. 2d 1.
In that case a Standard Detour Agreement adopted,
promulgated, and in use for years by the Association

of American Railroads used the phrase "in whatever
manner the same may be caused." Chief Justice Hutche-
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son speaking for the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals said
that this descriptive phrase did not require that ti
le
. "ff
p 1amti show "in the technical legal sense proxiruatP
causal connection between the operation of the detouring
train and the damages."
Even more fundamental, the agreement said:
". . . in whatever manner the same may he
caused or occasioned, whether by or through the
negligence of the Home Company ... or by reason
of defects in tracks, structures,or facilities furnished by the Home Company or otherwise.... "
As well they might, counsel for Union Pacific readilv
confess this case to be quite different from the case now
before the Court. (Brief p. 23). The basic differences
are that the negligence of Home was clearly contemplated
and, therefore, clearly stated, and the loss occurred because trains collided on the very tracks which wNe thi>
subject of the Standard Detour Agreement and not, as
~n this case, at a point far removed from the place and
the subject matter of the deed.

In a brief which warned the Court in advance that

defendant would rely on decisions, some of which "will
be old," Union Pacific places almost equal stress on the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, 29 years ago,
in Cacey v. Virginia.n Ry. Co., 85 F. 2d 977. In that ease
the Virginian Railway Co. exacted an encroachment lease
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from Cacey covering steps leading down to a railroad

track crossed by a path which was stated as constituting
a "walkway" which was necessary for Cacey's employees
and families living on one side of the track to use to
get to the other side. The indemnity agreement provided
that Cacey save Virginian harmless from any and all
claims by reason or in consequence of the occupancy
or the use of the premises or of the property of the railway company adjacent thereto.
Okley Stike, 8 years of age, was struck and seriously
injured by a passenger train while attempting to cross
the track. He had just descended the steps in question
and was standing on the ties when struck by a train.
It was contended that the lease agreement did not indemnify the railway company for injuries caused solely
by its negligence. The Circuit Court disagreed.
Circuit Judge Parker's dissent, reflecting the great
weight of authority as shown by the frequency of its
quotation in the cases, pointed out the absence of causal
relationship between the injury and the use of the crossing, drawing the distinction between the cause of an
injury and a mere condition without which it would not
have occurred.
'The Cacey majority opinion cannot serve as authority in the present case where a crossing right was not
even contemplated and the indemnity agreement is silent

T
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as to injuries arising by reason or in consequence of the
use of the crossing.
Eight years later, the Fourth Circuit had before it
Southern Ry. Co. v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. (4th 'Cir.
1944), 145 F. 2d 304. Southern brought suit against'Coea
Cola under an indemnity agreement given incident to the
construction by Coca Cola of a warehouse adjacent tu
Southern 's tracks. The agreement recited that the "exercise of the privilege herein granted" might create risk~
or loss which would not othrwise arise "except for such
use" (which plaintiff here contends was part of tlw
discussion between the parties before the date of the
deed) and the agreement then went on to cover
"any property loss or damage, death or personal
injury whatever, accruing or suffered or sustained
from or by reason of any act, negligence or default
of the licensee (Coca Cola), its agents, servanIB
or employees in or about or in connection '\ith
the exercise of the privilege ... granted or which
may in any manner or any extent be attributable
thereto or to the presence of the warehouse of the
licensee ... whether or not negligence on the part
of the railway company ... may have caused or
contributed to the loss, injury or damage, except
that the licensee shall not be held responsible for
any loss of life or personal injury, or damage. to
cars or property of the raaway company, accr~mg
from its own negligence, without fault of the licensee, its servants or employees."
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A brakeman employed by Southern was brushed
from a ear by the warehouse and badly injured. The
trial judge held that the damage fell within the exception
and the Circuit Court affirmed. The Circuit Court said:

"This contract was drawn by Southern. It
was signed, as so drawn, by Coca Cola without
the change of a word. When the words of a contract are ambiguous, it is a well-known and worthy
maxim of our law that such ambiguity should
be resolved against the party that drew the contract and selected its terminology and nomenclature."
The court also cited the general rule of construction,
referring with approval to the language of Circuit Judge
Parker in the Cacey case. This case was decided by
.Judge Parker, Soper and Dobie. Dobie wrote the decision. Soper dissented, stating that this ease is stronger
for the indemnitee than the Cacey case because in that
ease it was not expressly agreed that the Railway Company might recover notwithstanding negligence on its
part in creating the situation.
The Cacey decision was distinguished in Kansas

City So. Ry. Co. v. New Englalnd Fire Ins. Co. (8th Cir.
1943), 133 F. 2d 973, involving a lease of adjacent property for a canning factory and an indemnity agreement
which provided:
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"The lessee agrees to indemnify the railw ,

co~pany and save it hannless from any and ~l

clanns and expenses that may arise or may 1
made for death, injury, loss or damage resulti~<~
to the railway company's employees or propert,~
or to other persons or their property, by rea.~~~
or in consequence of the occupancy or use of said
premises by the lessee."
·The court pointed out that the lease involved in thP
Cacey case was made for the purpose of prott>cting tlw
railway company against the acquisition of rights in tht·
use of its property through the operation of limitations
and that in this case the agreement did not expressly
reflect an intention of the railway company to protect
itself from loss or damage to the property of the lessees
by reason of the operation of the railroad.
The court said further :
"Moreover, we think it cannot be said that
the loss in this case was caused by the occupancy
of the premises by the lessees. On the other hand,
the loss was caused by the acts of appellant's employees engaged in the operation of the railroad.''
This language is peculiarly appropriate for consideration in this case since 1Jnion Pacific's loss here wa.'
caused bv its negligence in operating its trains and tlw
operatio~, maintenance and existence of the pipe line
had no part in Stacey's accident.
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The cases otherwise discussed or cited by plaintiff
as aiding its principal thrust in this case prove, upon
examination, either to involve accidents occurring at the
precise place where the work involved in the contract
was to be performed or to involve facts completely dissimilar to this case.
rl'ypical is Ryan Mercantile Co. v. Great Northern
Railu·ay Co. (1961 9th C.C.A.), 294 F. 2d 629. Incredibly,
plaintiff says it is "almost identical" on its facts to the
case at bar. We need to say nothing more than to point
out that the agreement there provided for indemnity
"whether due to negligence of Great Northern" or not.
How Ryan can become "almost identical" with our
case when it has that language in its agreement can only
Ire determined by the legalistic legerdemain replete in
plaintiff's approach to this case.
Similar magic is utilized by plaintiff in urging the
Court that a decision of a "Wyoming federal judge,
applying \Vyoming law, to a Wyoming case" is in accord
with plaintiff's theory of this case. The case is O. &N. W.
Ry. C~. v. Rissler (D. C. Wyo. 1960), 184 Fed. Supp. 98
and again, examination of that case reveals the indemnity
agreement before that court contained an express provision by which the railroad was to be indemnified
against loss "even though the operation of the Railway
Company's railroad may have caused or contributed
thereto."
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These other points urged by plaintiff should be nientioned. First, plaintiff claims that it is defendant's position that the deed is ineffective to establish liability bi>·cause it does not mention the word "negligence." This
is but another "straw man'' because defendant has never
so contended. The Court will note that the second casp
we cited, and on which we rely, in this argument contained the flat statement that an agreement to be indemnified for one's own negligence need not be in "any
particular language or form" but the intention to indemnify must, nevertheless, be "unequivocally expressed
in the plainest of words." Batson-Cook v. lnd1tstrial
Steel Erectors (1958 5 C.C.A.), 251 F. 2d 410.

Second, plaintiff says defendant has contended
Stacey was not in the course of his employment at the
time of the accident and that this is of importance on thr
question of interpretation of the agreement.
Again, defendant has not relied upon, and does not
now rely upon, any such theory in this case. As shown
by the record (R. 101), defendant urged in the trial court
that whether or not Stacey was in the scope of his employment had no bearing on the construction of this
contract. We reiterate that position and refer the Court
to a federal decision which specifically holds in accord.
See Employer Casualty Co. v. Howard T. Foley Co., foe.
(5th C.C.A. 1946), 158 F. 2d 363.
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As a make weight, the railroad asserts that an
easement at the crossing was granted by implication.
Before responding to this assertion it may be well to
repeat ct>rtain of the pivotal facts. (1) The railroad
does not now and never has owned the crossing, and
(:2) the crossing and the lands deeded for the pipe line
have never been parts of the same estate.
EasPments by implication arise under certain conditions but only upon "severance of an estate by a sale of
a part thereof.... " Adamson, et ux. v. Brockbank, et al.,
112 Utah 52, 185 P. 2d 246 (1947); the first requirement
is: "Unity of title followed by severance." Morris v.
Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161P.1127 (1916), Savage v. Nielsen,
et al., 11+ rtah 22, 197 P. 2d 117 (1948), Thompson, et
al. v. Nelson, et al., 2 Utah 2d 340, 273 P. 2d 720 (1954).
1

1

There can be no private way of necessity over the
land of a stranger. Leinweber, et ux. v. Gallaugher, et al.
(Wash. 1940), 98 P. 2d 311.
Fnion Pacific says that if its deed does not constitute an agreement to indemnify it for this loss, "then the
English language is inadequate to perform that function."
The obvious answer to that contention is found in the
numerous cases, cited by both parties in these briefs,
where ordinary and commonplace words sufficed to
frame a clear, distinct and undoubted agreement to in·
demnify. The broad language chosen by the railroad here
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fails in that purpose, if, in fact, such purpose ever existed.
The Supreme Court of California, in the Vinnell case
(supra) disposed of a similar complaint about the inadequacies of the language by this apt quotation from an
earlier Calfornia case :
The defendant itself wrote the provision
into the contract for its own benefit. It could have
plainly stated, if such was the understanding of the
parties, that the plaintiff agreed to relieve it in the
matter from all liability for its own negligence. As
it did not do so, we resolve all doubt, as we should,
in favor of the plaintiff, and hold that it was not
the intent of the parties to give to the contract
as written the effect claimed by the company.'"
"

'

1

CONCLUSION
The controlling facts, including the most favorable
evidence the railroad could bring before the Court, show
the parties did not discuss or negotiate the question of
indemnity for plaintiff's negligence.
The same facts show that parties did not have the
intent to agree upon such indemnity, whether discussed,
negotiated, or not.
The same facts show the parties neither negotiated,
discussed nor agreed upon the use of the crossing where
the accident occurred nor the liability which might arise
from such use.
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The same facts clearly show the loss was due to
and arose from the negligence of the railroad and not
from the existence, operation or use of the pipe line.
The cases on which plaintiff relies almost all contain
some language tending to show an intent such as plaintiff would now infer from the absence of such language.
Further, and unlike this case, almost all of them concern
an agreement which was designed to cover the very
place where the loss occurred, or the equipment which
caused it.
As a part of its argument, the railroad describes
these parties as "major corporations." However, the law
to be announced by this Court in its decision of this
case will apply to all - from the giant corporation to
the embattled farmer or rancher who seeks a right of way
for pasturage. To the end that all our citizens, and
not just the "major corporations,'' can understand the
responsibilities a simple document may thrust upon them,
this Court should reaffirm these basic and fundamental
principles:
(1) a contract will not be rewritten by the
courts; and
(2) a contract will be strictly construed
against the party whose contract it was; and
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(3) a contract will not be construed to provide for indemnity against one'g own negligenrti
unless the intention to assume such responsihilit\·
is stated in plain, unequivocal and unambiguou:,
terms.
These principles, when applied to the facts of this
case, will demonstrate conclusively that plaintiff should
not be indemnified and that the summary judgment
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRIST'ENSEN
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents

